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BOOK REVIEWS
directs a tax at federal instrumentalities by specifically including them in a
statute whose terms did not theretofore embrace them. See Note (193o)
43 HARv. L. REv. 280, 285. There is language in the cases to support such a
limitation. See Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts, supra, at 631; Miller v.
Milwaukee, 272 U. S. 713, 715 (1927). It has been thought, however, that
the Macallen decision really involves the much broader principle that a state
may not include income from United States bonds in the measure of a franchise tax. Aberdeen Say. & Loan Co. v. Chase, 289 Pac. 536 (Wash. 193o);
see Powell, supra, at 92. This interpretation, taken together with Long v.
Rockwood, leads to the conclusion that a franchise tax measured by patent
or copyright royalties should be invalid. Quicksafe Mfg. Co. v. Graham,
But the courts may refuse to extend to
29 S. W.(2d) 253 (Tenn. 1930).
income derived merely from the use of a privilege granted by the national
government the same protection accorded income received directly from the
national government.
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and stipulated that
CLAUSE. - T left all his property to the "Estate of T"
"no part of said property be given unto" his niece. No such corporate entity as the "Estate of T" existed. The niece brought a proceeding for construction of the will. Held, that the property passed to those who would take
upon intestacy, and that the share which would be receivable by the niece
was to be distributed among the others. Order to proceed accordingly.
Matter of Weissman, 137 Misc. 113, 243 N. Y. Supp. 127 (1930).
A merely negative provision in a will, unaccompanied by a valid disposition of the whole of the testator's property, will not serve to disinherit an
heir. Matter of Trumble, 199 N. Y. 454, 92 N. E. 1073 (i91o); Phelps v.
Stoner's Adm'r, 184 Ky. 466, 239 S. W. 780 (1919); see PAGE, WILLS (2d ed.
1928) § 8I8; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) § 499; (192o) 33
HARv. L. REv. 618. Contra:Succession of Allen, 48 La. Ann. 1036, 20 So. 193
(1896). And courts are generally slow to construe a disposition as complete,
to the heir's exclusion. Lane v. Patterson, 138 Ga. 710, 76 S. E. 47 (1912);
But cf. McCaffrey v.
cf. Tea v. Millen, 257 Ill. 624, ioi N. E. 209 (913).
Manogue, 196 U. S. 563 (19o5). This reluctance finds its origin in the principle that testamentary power is based on statute, and that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed. See (1920) 33 HARv. L.
REv. 618. A designation of the beneficiary in an insurance contract as the
"estate of" the insured has received an interpretation like that in the principal case. Weed v. London & LancashireFire Ins. Co., 116 N.Y. io6, 22 N. E.
No cases have
229 (1899); Clinton v. Hope Ins. Co., 45 N. Y. 454 (1871).
been found involving the construction of such a designation in a will. But
if, despite the indicated attitude, the interpretation of the instant case is
followed, the legacy may be considered as a gift to a class, and the subsequent
exclusion of a member of the class is, on established principles, valid. Estate
of McGovran, 19o Pa. 375, 42 At. 705 (1889); Bund v. Green, 12 Ch. D.
819 (1879).
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CONDITIONAL SALES.
1929. Pp. x, 521.

By Roger S. Hoar.

New York: The Ronald Press.

$10.00.

This is a handy manual for business executives, credit men, and collection
departments, prepared by the attorney for a large scale, habitual conditional

HARVARD LAW REVIEW
seller. It is obviously based on a careful investigation of decisions, statutes,
and practices, and reflects wide experience in drafting and enforcing installment contracts throughout the United States.
About four-fifths of the text is given over to a discussion of the status
of conditional sales under the common law and the older statutes, the effect
of the uniform acts thereon, the execution, filing, refiling, and foreclosure of
such contracts, with final chapters on auction sales, bankruptcy and receivership, sales for resale, "quasi-fixtures," discharges, assignments, criminal
statutes, usury, taxation, insurance, and drafting suggestions. The latter
one-fifth of the book is devoted to a list of cited statutes, collected by
states, an exhaustive set of forms, a brief bibliography, and an index. Besides making liberal references to state and federal statutes, the author cites
approximately sixteen hundred cases.
The work seems generally accurate and done with good judgment. It contains a large amount of detailed information regarding local conditional sales
law and practice which is valuable. For example, in discussing the filing
district, it explains the split-county situations in Alabama, Kentucky, Missouri, and Virginia.
Mr. Hoar's zeal for the welfare of the conditional seller is unbounded.
No stone is left unturned in the effort to give the seller a water-tight, bombproof contract, valid and recordable everywhere, and enforceable with the
maximum of benefit to the seller and the minimum of protection to the buyer.
Methods of aiding the latter are not within the scope of the treatise. For
example, the means, direct and indirect, of getting the highest possible rate
of interest without violating the usury laws, and of securing a valid waiver
by the buyer of any statutory protection he may have, are both outlined.
Noteworthy omissions from the book are the material on conditional sales
of fixtures and railroad equipment. The absence of any treatment of the
former, at least, seems regrettable because of the frequence and importance
of the fixture transaction and the lack of apparent reason for excluding it
from a general book on conditional sales.
The sections are brief, condensed, dogmatic, without much illustration and
with little attention to historical treatment. It is a book for administrators
making quick decisions, and not for students who desire a foundation and
superstructure or for lawyers who wish an exhaustive analysis and complete
references. Mr. Hoar assumes a rather general knowledge of underlying
business customs and legal rules. His footnotes usually cite one case or
statute only, and often no authorities are given for statements which might
well excite a desire for further investigation, as, for example, his assertion
that ordinary leases must be recorded in New Mexico and South Carolina,"
have special Statutes of Limitations applying to condiand that certain states
2
tional sales only.
The brevity of much of the discussion may be judged from the elevenline consideration of the nature of the trust receipt and the comparison of it
with the conditional sale. The rather arbitrary disposal of some questions
is also to be observed; for example, 3 the author states without argument or explanation that there is "absolutely no logical reason" why the
conditional sale for resale should not be good as against all but the ordinary
customers of the vendee, and ignores the opportunity which that transaction

1

P. 12.

2 P. 234.

3 PP. 31O-11.
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gives the vendee to mislead his creditors and to obtain credit on the faith
of apparent ownership.
Mr. Hoar lays emphasis on a chapter called "Uniformity of Uniform
Laws." The uniform acts each have a section directing the courts to construe the act "so as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the
law of those states which enact it." The author argues that this section
compels, and not merely persuades, a court to follow the decisions of the
courts of another state when in point. He cites 4 a number of cases
which he says support this position. On examination, however, they are
found to be instances in which courts have willingly accepted decisions
from other states in construing a uniform act, even to the extent of overturning a local rule, adopted before the enactment of the uniform law.
In giving such voluntary recognition to foreign decisions, the courts have
sometimes stated in rather broad language a general duty to follow such foreign decisions. But Mr. Hoar does not point out cases in which a court construing a uniform act has unwillingly admitted that it was bound to follow
the construction put upon the act by a court of another state. Such a foreign decision is no doubt extremely persuasive and, except in rare instances,
would be followed; but experience has shown that if the foreign decision happens to seem to the local court badly reasoned and poorly decided the local
court will regretfully refuse to accept it. In many instances the courts have
disagreed on the construction of the Negotiable Instruments Law. One of
the most potent reasons for the present movement to provide uniform amendments to that act is the desire to harmonize conflicting construction. Here,
notoriously, the courts have refused to adhere blindly to earlier foreign
construction of the uniform statute.
Another matter treated by Mr. Hoar at length and with urgency is
the effect of the Uniform Sales Act in validating conditional sales. He
accepts and champions Scherer-Gillett Co. v. Long,5 in which it was held
that the Uniform Sales Act (especially Section 20) validated the conditional
sale in Illinois after it had been declared void as against innocent third
persons for many years. It seems clear to the reviewer that the Uniform Sales
Act applies to the conditional sale wherever that institution is recognized,
but that it takes no position regarding the occasionally disputed question
whether a conditional sale is fraudulent and whether the conditional seller
should be estopped as against innocent third persons from setting up his reserved title. In Section 23 of the Uniform Sales Act it is in substance provided that a seller can pass no better title than he has, except in cases of
estoppel and some other instances. The Act makes no effort to define
estoppel, but leaves in effect any rules already existing in the several
states. Among such rules in a few jurisdictions was the doctrine that
a conditional seller was estopped from asserting his title as against innocent purchasers from, and creditors of, a conditional buyer. In Kentucky
conditional sales have long been treated as having the legal effect of a chattel
mortgage. Kentucky recently adopted the Sales Act. It would no doubt
surprise Kentucky lawyers to be told that the adoption of the Uniform Act
has validated the conditional sale as a distinct institution and thus overturned the long-standing policy of the commonwealth.
4 PP. 4o_41.

5 318 D11.432,

:149 N. E. 225

(1925).
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Mr. Hoar has achieved the seemingly impossible task of writing a book on
sales without once referring to Professor Williston's work or views. In his
bibliography and elsewhere he seems to manifest a marked preference for the
commercial services and practitioners' books, as distinguished from the products of the law school faculties.
GEORGE G. BOGERT.
University of Chicago Law School.
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES. By Karl N. Llewellyn. Chicago: Callaghan and Company. 1930. Pp. xxxv, 1081. $9.00.
Professor Llewellyn has prefaced his book with an introduction of fifteen
pages in which he explains his purposes and attempts to justify them. He
sets forth his views on teaching law, teaching the law of sales, sales as a casemethod course in the second year, and the net purpose of annotations. In
addition he furnishes to the student and reviewer statistics of the book. He
has, indeed, written a full and thorough review of his own book from his own
point of view, and certainly no one could have done it better. It seems to
the reviewer, therefore, that it would serve no very.useful purpose to attempt
a detailed exposition of Professor Llewellyn's views or to attempt to support,
modify, or refute them. Two main features of the book, however, deserve
comment: the use of case material, and the scope and arrangement of the
book.
The author's position on the use of cases may be summarized as follows:
the facts of a case are its most important element; rarely does the student
of decisions get the facts undistorted; there is the inevitable distortion because the facts reach him second-hand and usually third-hand, and the further
distortion due to the court's molding of the facts to fit the decision; it is consequently necessary for the student to read a great quantity of cases and
critically to compare them in order to detect and reduce these distortions
and to appreciate the law of sales in judicial action; in order that a casebook should present material in sufficient quantity it is necessary to print
cases in quantity, and therefore it is necessary because of space limitations to
edit and cut the cases, facts and opinions, to the least possible content; this
process does no great harm, since the subject of Sales is usually a secondyear course, and the student learns to study cases in the orthodox manner in
the first year.
It may be admitted that facts are most important. That they reach the
student subject to some distortion is inevitable: they usually reach the trial
court second-hand, the appellate court third-hand, and the student fourthhand; and, in addition, two of these stages are often subject to conscious distortion of counsel designed to make those facts produce desired results. The
danger of this type of distortion is always present, but it is to be doubted if
intentional distortion by the court is an important factor in Sales, where
there is much less opportunity for emotional reaction than in some of the
more dramatic subjects of the law. An attempt to determine the significance
of this factor seems to involve a study of psychology or judicial administration rather than of the substantive law of sales. Hard cases make bad law,
or good law, depending upon the view one takes, in Sales as in other subjects.
But such cases are distinctly the exception rather than the rule. Moreover,

